The British operation was limited to just 600 troops of the 3rd Battalion.  The Battalion would fly from RAF air fields on Cyprus, but, because of lack of parking space at the airfields, and because of the older British aircraft, obsolete side loading Hastings and Valentines, the initial assault would be dangerously small.  One of the main reasons the British had to use these older aircraft was the United States, who were totally against any military action, refused to supply any help to Britain and France, especially in the form of Aircraft. Also, because of the shortage of aircraft, the Battalion would have to land with no heavy weapons support.  The plan allowed the Battalion eight minutes to drop all its troops and equipment at El Gamil, an airfield that was 1 mile long and only half a mile wide, bounded on both sides by water.  To avoid drifting in the air they planned to drop in 3 waves at  varying heights. The first wave would drop at 500 ft, the second wave, , the Heavy lift,  at 800 ft, and the third and last wave at 1,000 ft. This also met the Paratroops would be in the air the shortest amount of time possible.

Early on the 5th of November, the Battalion boarded their aircraft in Nicosia, Cyprus. 3 Para would drop before the French.  Three companies, (A, B and C), and their suppliers, were lifted from Nicosia aboard  26 Hastings and Valetta's.  Protected by RAF fighters and ground attack aircraft, the heavily laden transports approached the DZ. at 0515, flying from the northwest directly into the sun. At 0715 hours, despite the delays, caused by the old side loading aircraft, 85% of the Battalion was on the ground within 10 minutes, having suffered only one fatality, and a few major injuries.

Unlike their French Allies, the British did not carry any personal weapons for using during their descent, and had to wait until they were on the ground before they could break open the containers that carried their small arms and ammunition. Many of the British paratroopers would have been killed as they landed on the open airfield, but the Egyptians, fearing a landing, had covered the runway with sand filled oil drums. These drums provided cover for the British paratroopers, and they were able to secure their weapons, reorganize, and move in to attack the defenders.

A Company rushed to secure the northwestern end of the airfield, encountering only sporadic resistance from Egyptian defenders. B company moved towards the Port Said end of the airfield, to block Egyptian reinforcements. The fighting was a short and bloody, hand to hand engagement all the way.  C Company cleared the airfield itself setting up a command post and defensive positions among oil drums strewn across the runway.  Within 30 minutes the objective was firmly in British hands. A second lift brought in the rest of 3 Para, and on the return trip the helicopters evacuated the wounded to the fleet offshore. During the day, 3 Para was attacked by French jet fighters. Fortunately the Battalion did not suffer casualties from this attack. Not the first time friendly fire would problems during Operation Musketeer.

Meanwhile, the French 2 RCP, who had dropped onto a smaller DZ. south of the Raswa bridges at 0530, had a very successful assault.  They landed in an incredibly short period time, 4 minutes, but had to fight to establish their hold, having dropped literally  on to the heads of the Egyptian defenders.  They advanced, and captured the western end of the Raswa Bridge by 0900.  The French dug in around their objective, sending out probing patrols towards Port Said. At 1530 they were joined by a second battalion, which dropped onto salt pans to the east of Port Fuad.  Meanwhile, a small detachment of British Paras from the 9th  Independent Squadron Royal Engineers, who had landed with the French first wave, conducted a reconnaissance down the canal towards Ismailia, but found no signs of the enemy.