DEATH OF A TERRORIST - BIRTH OF A LEGEND

The story of Gregoris Afxentiou
By
David Carter

THE afternoon sun was groping its way through a blanket of rain-laden gray clouds when Gregoris Afxentiou, EOKA's second-in-command, met his death in the ‘Valley of the Knife’ as a bone-chilling wind whipped the Troodos Mountains and the sounds of machine gun fire and explosions echoed around their peaks.

It was Sunday, 3 March 1957, a few minutes after 14.00. For eight hours, Afxentiou and his gang of four terrorists had defied a cordon of 60 British troops who had tracked him for days and in the early hours of the morning found his hiding place not far from Makhaeras monastery.

From the start of the EOKA conflict, Afxentiou had been a formidable opponent and the British placed a reward of £5,000 on his head. While he had escaped from British hands and eluded capture on numerous other occasions, sometimes by just a matter of minutes, he must have known that now he had two choices: either surrender or die in what would be a one-sided battle.

Afxentiou chose death and so created a legend. His stand has become one of the epics of Greek history, taking its place alongside Koungi, Arkadi, Thermopylae and Gravis in exaggerated speeches and books about his life.

For Greek Cypriots Afxentiou remains their revolutionary hero sans peur et sans reproche and pre-eminent in the struggle to liberate Cyprus from British colonial rule and unite it with Greece.

‘It's a pity we have to kill people like that,’ Frank Dewsbury, a former member of a Special Operations Group, told this author. ‘This statement may make me sound like an EOKA sympathizer, but I respect good soldiers and brave men doing a hard dangerous job whatever their nationality or cause, most professional military men feel the same.’

Lt Colonel Britten of the Grenadier Guards who was present at the time of Afxentiou’s death has also observed: ‘He fought back bravely, determined to sell his life dearly.’

During an earlier attempt to capture Afxentiou, another British officer told his father: ‘As a soldier, of course I want to capture him-he is an arch-terrorist and it's my duty. As a man, I want to congratulate you on having such a splendid son...’

Afxentiou commanded respect from his supporters and the British Army alike because he was the only military-trained member of EOKA, apart from the leader Colonel George Grivas, who spent most of his ‘small war’ hiding in Limassol. Afxentiou, by contrast, led his inexperienced men from the front and fought his opponents openly.

EOKA's only ‘professional soldier’


Afxentiou in military uniform during his Greek Army service.

GREGORIS Pieris Afxentiou was born in Lysi village on 22 February 1928 and received his education at the Famagusta Hellenic Gymnasium. He went to Greece in the hope of entering the Hellenic Military Academy in Athens, but was turned down. Nevertheless he joined the Greek Army in December 1949 as a volunteer and attended a reserve officer's academy on the island of Syros. He reached the rank of a second lieutenant or Anthypolokhagos. But his father needed him back home and so he returned to the Island and the family's small farm to work as a truck driver. Soon afterwards he became engaged to Vasiliki Panay, his longtime village sweetheart.

Filled with Greek nationalism, once Afxentiou heard about the insurrection planned by Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas, he enlisted in the ranks of the guerillas, most of whom the leader considered of ‘poor quality’, but when they met for the first time in 1955, Grivas saw a man he thought he could mold as a young fighter. He took Afxentiou to Palouriotissa village in early February and put him through a concentrated course in leadership and sabotage. During the training the two men often discussed life at the Athens Military Academy.

Meticulous planner

ON the opening night of the EOKA conflict - 31 March/1 April 1955 - Grivas assigned Afxentiou the task of blowing up the Cyprus Broadcasting Station in Nicosia. Others were given other targets across the Island. Their bombs went off simultaneously at 00.30.

His mission successfully completed, Grivas ordered Afxentiou to return home and go about his business as usual. By the next day, however, the police had identified him and he went on the run to become leader of a mountain group near Kyrenia. He was given the code-name Zidros. For several months, he taught his men how to use weapons and the techniques of guerrilla warfare among the peaks of the Pentadactylos Mountain range.

Afxentiou believed in meticulously planning his attacks against British forces. Grivas, on the other hand, wanted quick results, but his protégé was determined not to waste lives needlessly and do anything that dishonored his sense of military honor. The colonel often reprimanded him for ‘lack of energy’. Grivas said later: ‘Afxentiou would bow his head and say nothing, but he could never be hurried against his will.'

Unlike Grivas, Afxentiou also showed compassion for those who became informers. Against orders, he refused to execute a man who had betrayed his group. Because the man’s wife had just given birth, he ordered his gang to release him, but warned him to never repeat his offence, as mercy would not be shown again. ‘You are too kind hearted,’ his men chorused. Afxentiou replied: ‘I'm a fighter, not a butcher.’

Afxentiou also believed in education and encouraged his men to read books and study when time allowed.

Love and marriage

Actors play the roles of Afxentiou and his bride in a dramatized reconstruction for a Greek Cypriot TV documentary.

DURING the build up to the first organized ambushes of British patrols and convoys, Afxentiou secretly married Vasiliki Panayi on 10 June 1955. The wedding was organized as if it were a military campaign. Accompanied by a friend, the girl was taken by an EOKA member to Nicosia and from there to a little monastery not far from the American monitoring station near Karavas.

Papastavros Papagathanangelou, the priest who was later exiled with Makarios to the Seychelles, arrived in another car and by another route.

The wedding took place with Afxentiou's gang guarding the monastery walls. The ceremony over, he returned to the mountains almost at once and his wife went back to their village. A month later, they met again for a few days. That was the last time they saw each other.

After Operation Lucky Alphonse in 1956, when Grivas escaped and settled in Limassol, Afxentiou was placed in charge of guerilla activities in the whole central area of the Troodos Mountains. His main task was to co-ordinate and re-organize the mountain gangs the British had broken up and scattered. He tramped the rugged area meeting leaders and gathering recruits, some of whom had escaped from detention and soon the antartes were back in action.

Afxentiou (left) Marcos Drakos (right) ‘somewhere in the Troodos Mountains’.

Until the end of the year, Afxentiou’s hit-and-run methods against military convoys on the Nicosia-Limassol road caused the British a lot of trouble. He soon became the authorities' ‘Most Wanted’ terrorist. But his time was running out as the British began to receive better intelligence.

The British strike back.

IN December 1956, the security forces smashed the terrorists' arms-smuggling ring in Limassol, capturing 44 gang members that included customs officials. Arms and munitions would now be in short supply for EOKA.

In his Memoirs, Grivas admitted his worries of the British counter-offensive. ‘Trouble began when the Limassol smuggling network was broken and the EOKA customs’ team arrested, along with several important Limassol leaders, including three men who knew my whereabouts,’ he wrote. ‘These were Manolis Savvides and Andreas Papadopoulos, who had helped to build the hideout I was living in, and Dafnis Panayides, whose house I had stayed at from June to September of that year. If any of them broke down under torture my life was in grave danger.’

In January 1957, British counter-insurgency tactics improved dramatically when Major-General Joe Kendrew took over and combined the posts of District Commander, previously held by Major-General Ricketts and Chief of Staff, a role Brigadier Baker had filled. Baker was now appointed Director of Operations.

The mysterious Captain Savery

A sketch map of the Zoopiyi operation on New Year's Eve 1956.

RATHER than throwing vast numbers of troops at the enemy in large-scale operations, Kendrew and Baker increasingly used the so-called Q patrols to gather intelligence in EOKA dominated areas and then followed up with small, fast-moving teams - often carried in helicopters-to snatch and grab suspects.

The Q Patrols consisted of civilian police officers, Greek Cypriot informers with detailed knowledge of the areas involved and specially selected soldiers, none probably more effective than Captain Lionel Savery. At considerable danger to himself, he often roamed the mountains alone disguised as a villager recording what he saw.

Occasionally Savery took part in a Q Patrol operation. On New Year’s Eve, tipped off by an informer that Grivas was hiding in Zoopiyi, he led a patrol into the village, using an old taxi as cover. Grivas wasn’t there, but Afxentiou was. A firefight broke out, but Grivas’s No 2 escaped with a bullet wound. However, his friend, Michael Georgallas, was killed.

Coupled with information gained by Savery from captured EOKA men and the intelligence coming from SOG, a clear picture was emerging about where Afxentiou and his men were headed.

There were also SAS men following the terrorists from hide to hide. Frank Dewsbury says: ‘If recognized by SOG, they were allowed to continue under continuous surveillance, with the hope that they would lead us to their safe houses, other terrorists, arms dumps and hopefully Grivas himself.’

‘Black Mak’ back foots EOKA

AT the start of the New Year, Brigadier Baker launched Operation Black Mak/. With every passing day in January it gathered momentum as the Army, RAF and civilian police worked together. The operation’s primary objective in the mountains was to capture or kill Markos Drakos, Polycarpos Georghadjis, and Afxentiou.

Snow lay thick in the Troodos Mountains, but in spite of the severe weather conditions the Parachute Regiment and the Suffolks, issued with special winter clothing, established more observation posts.

At the slightest sign of EOKA movement, the RAF flew troops to the spot, carrying them three at a time in 12 brand new Sycamore helicopters based at Nicosia Airport. If there were no safe landing place, the soldiers descended by rope, a technique they had developed in Malaya against the Communist insurgents.

By now the authorities had also declared parts of the Troodos ‘prohibited areas’, where small hunter units of the army could shoot strangers on site.

Marcos Drakos (extreme left) with his gang pose for an EOKA propaganda photograph.

First of the terrorists to fall in this new campaign was Marcos Drakos (Code name: Lykourgos and Mavilis) on the night of 18/19 January. His gang had been the first to launch an organized attack on British Forces. It took place in the Mersinaki area in mid-December 1955.

Moving his gang and weapons under cover of darkness and a heavy mist through the ‘no-go’ land near Evrykhou village, Drakos, failed to see he was walking his men into a carefully prepared ambush. When the British spotted him at about midnight, it was too late for him to escape.

There was a short fire-fight between his gang and the 1 Suffolk Regiment patrol from D Company led by Corporal B King and consisting of Lance-Corporal H Fowler, Privates Brasset, Cooper, Sells, Willson and Woods. Minutes later, Drakos lay dead, 13 bullets in his body. While King and Fowler were credited with the ‘kill’, Greek Cypriot historian Doros Alastos claims Drakos committed suicide.

Tefkros Loizou, one of the terrorists to survive, later described the encounter: ‘Three times we came across English soldiers. The first time we exchanged fire. The second we didn’t. The weather was very bad. Suddenly there was a streak of lightning. In that moment Drakos and an English soldier spotted and shot at each other. I was next to him. I saw him fall. The rest of us changed direction and managed to get away.’

For the Suffolks, after nearly five months of continuous hard work with little to show except small finds of explosives and ammunition, the death of Drakos was considered due reward for their efforts.

‘This success, which was followed by messages of congratulations from H E the Governor, C-in-C MELF the Director of Operations, and many others, had a tremendous effect on morale in the Battalion and everyone looked forward to further successes in the near future,’ reported The Suffolk Journal.

The fireplace hide

THREE days after the death of Drakos, George Matsis was captured in Saranti village.The highlight of his EOKA career had been raiding a British arms store in Famagusta and getting away with Sten guns, ammunitions and grenades, part of the supplies removed from the Canal Zone in Egypt. He was convicted by a Special Court in May 1957 for being in possession of arms, ammunition, bombs and hand grenades and received a 10-year prison sentence to be served in the UK. With the signing of the 1959 peace treaties in London, he was released from custody and transferred to Greece until Cyprus gained its independence.

When the news was announced that Matsis was a British prisoner, Athens Radio urged ‘all Cypriot children should try to be like him. Troodos is in silence; not even the birds are singing’ and said, Matsis was ‘beloved of the gods’. In his diary,Grivas noted: ‘EOKA has lost a brave and honest soldier. May his memory be eternal. His self-sacrifice and patriotism will be an example to all.’

George Kyriakou Matsis, Detained Person No. 8675.

On the same day Matsis was caught , 2 Para struck hard against the EOKA gangs in the eastern Troodos. With the aid of huge flares, 30parachutists, made night descents from helicopters, despite the wind gusting at 50 knots, on to several high points in the Adelphi Forest and at Omodhos, a shiny white vineyard village of small, neat housesand narrow streets of cobble stones.

A Parachute Regiment officer entered the cottage of the village police constable. Sitting in front of a blazing fire, the constable was helping a child with his homework, while his wife tended a baby in a cradle. Another child crawled on the floor and a grandmother was setting the table. But this calm family scene didn’t fool the young lieutenant. He noticed the fire had only just been lit.

Kicking it apart, he found the hearthstone moved. Underneath was a shaft leading down to a room in which eight men were hiding. They came out one by one, hands raised. The much-wanted Argyrious Karademas, Greek arms smuggler, trained saboteur and prison breaker was among them.

The last man to surrender was Polycarpos Georghadjis (Code-name: Klimis and Cicero.) Georghadjis had been part of the terrorist organization from its start. To his supporters the 26-year-old was known as ‘Houdini’ for his numerous escapes from custody.

Grivas considered him so important that he arranged his escape from Nicosia General Hospital on 31 August 1956, during which Sergeant L A Demmon of the UK Police Unit was gunned down. Georghadjis’s position in EOKA had given him the right to ‘execute’ anyone he deemed a ‘traitor’ within its ranks, a power he exercised with relish.

In a single week, Operation Black Mak, the Paras eliminated 21 ‘hard-core’ terrorists, three with rewards of £5,000 on their heads, (which the soldiers were ineligible to collect), and captured 2,000 rounds of ammunition, 46 weapons, including six Thompson submachine guns two 3.5 bazooka rocket launchers. Their prisoners quickly became informers.

Orders to re-group

GRIVAS recognized his groups after the grave blows his organization was receiving. ιTwo guerrilla groups had been wiped out at a time when we were short of good men,᾿ he admitted in his Memoirs. ιBut I was sure the tide would soon turn, and Afxentiou shared my faith. He wrote to me after these arrests: "I understand the size of our misfortunes, but we will not retreat; on the contrary, we shall throw ourselves into the fight with greater determination than ever and fill the gaps that have been created. Our faith in victory is unshakeable."᾿

‘I told him, in my reply, to take great care, regroup and return the enemy's blows so that we could show we still had plenty of fight left in us. I wrote: "In time of trial the true fighter shows how he can face trouble with courage and calmness. If our ranks have been thinned, they must remain unbroken. The gaps will soon be filled and the Organization will continue its mission. If everyone stays at his post and does his duty the wheel will turn once more in our favor."’

To add to Grivas’s woes, town gangs were being rounded up as well. On 30 January, Special Branch officers swooped on a house in Dhali, 12 miles north of Nicosia, on a tip-off that netted Nicos Sampson, the Murder Mile killer, who led the capital’s execution squads. His capture was soon followed by the arrests of Andreas Chartas, the capital’s overall gang leader, and a young theologian Phidias Kareolemos, the head of the courier team.

On 1 February George Papaverkiou and Takis Sofocleus, obeying orders from Grivas that groups should attack at whatever cost to themselves, went out to ambush a convoy of seven army trucks. They blew up the first vehicle, but a hail of bullets from the soldiers in the other vehicles cut down the two 20-year-olds. Despite the continuing successes of the security forces, Grivas attempted to raise popular morale by claiming the British were concealing their own casualties, and kept up a bar-rage of leaflets denouncing them of being ‘vandals’, ‘torturers’ and of using ‘brutality’ in the detention centers, which the US Consul-General was invited to visit ‘in order to see the deeds of your allies’.

But the pressure on EOKA did not let up. In February, 16 Para Brigade handed over its responsibilities in Operation Black Mak to 40 Commando, while north of Paphos, 1 Lancashire Fusiliers arrived from the UK and pitched camp to reinforce 1 Agra. 1 Duke of Wellington and 1 Grenadier Guards now wanted to claim the biggest catch of all: Afxentiou.

‘Beaters’ on the march

IN Nicosia, General Kendrew held a press conference to announce the Army’s successes. His Brigadier J A Hopwood, pink-cheeked and wax-mustached, said: ‘It was like a jolly big shoot, and my men acted as beaters.’

Kendrew went as far as thanking Grivas ‘for the wonderful training opportunity afforded my men’.

Kendrew's beaters next caught up with the No 3 on Britain’s ‘Most Wanted’ list: Stylianos Lenas (Code-name: Krupps), EOKA's armorer.

Lenas, too, had been active from the first day of the conflict, when he attacked Wolesley Barracks in Nicosia. The price on his head was £5,000. A former plumber from Nicosia, he operated in the Khandria area.

On 17 February his hiding place between Potamittissa and Pelendri was discovered by 8 and 9 section patrols from 40 Commando RM led by Lt Marshal and Lt Haynes.

Lt P Hayne’s patrol take a rest break in the Troodos.

Lenas and his gang tried to break out of the Marine cordon and there was a vigorous exchange of automatic fire, during which Haynes lost his life and Lenas was severely wounded. He was rushed to the RAF Akrotiri hospital for urgent medical attention, but died six weeks later from his injuries.

Some of his gang members escaped the Marine ambush, but not Demetrios Christodoulou-also known as Demetrakis. He surrendered and gave up his Italian rifle and several grenades.

A Lenas gang member lies dead after a short fight with the Royal Marines.

After his capture, however, he tried to getaway and was shot dead. The remaining gang members ran into another patrol. Two were killed on sight. One of them was another EOKA activist, Soteris Tsangaris. The third, Panayiotis Aristides, wasn’t caught.

Captured EOKA arms

‘The search for terrorist weapons was a time consuming but essential exercise,’ wrote Major J C Beadle, MBE, MC, RM, in his book, The Light Blue Lanyard. ‘During the latter part of February, patrols from A and B Troops netted two revolvers, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, four 12-inch mortar bombs, four shot guns, a grenade, seven home-made bombs, an anti-tank mine and several sticks of dynamite.

When Operation Black Mak concluded at the end of the month it was rated by the British the largest and most successful campaign yet against EOKA. A total of 17 hideouts (not all of them occupied) had been found, behind bookcases and false walls and down hidden trapdoors. One contained 300 cans of food, including Scotch salmon.

What made the soldiers' task simpler was that Cypriots were talking-a sign, in the eyes of Field Marshal Sir John Harding, that ‘they are weary of fruitless terrorism’.

A cordon-and-search patrol of the Royal Berkshire Regiment goes about its business in Pelendria village.

The all-out assault on EOKA continued remorselessly with units from 3 Infantry Brigade, including men of the Royal Berkshires, Ox and Bucks, South Staffordshires, Lancashire Fusiliers, and Grenadier Guards.

Operation Whisky Mak

A map of the area in which Operation Whisky Mak was conducted. A red star inside a blue circle marks the Makhaeras Monastery site.

ON 28 February, 1 Duke of Wellington’s No. 11 and SOE Platoons, under command of D Company, were deployed in the vicinity of a forest rest house and a nearby deserted cottage, three miles to the north of the Makhaeras Monastery, which dominated the countryside from its position 2,000 ft. high on the slopes of Mt Kionia.

The 12th century independent Makhaeras Monastery in the ‘Valley of the Knife’.

Governor Harding’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Victor Balfour, said: ‘We knew that when Afxentiou was in trouble, he invariably came to the Makhaeras area.’

At first the British troops suspected Afxentiou and his men were hiding inside the monastery. Now two terrorists confirmed their suspicions. They had been captured in Omodhos by Captain Lionel Savery and switched sides to become willing informers. They were immediately taken to Platres, four miles away, for further questioning by Lt. D S Gilbert-Smith, MC, and 2Lt. P Naylor.

The informers, one of whom had been a member of Afxentiou's gang, pointed out caches of ammunition, explosives and food, and, more importantly, told the two officers, Afxentiou had, in fact, lived in the Forest Rest House for long periods in the past and that on these occasions, supplies had been brought up from the Monastery on mules, led by a man named Petros, who was employed there.

This lead was what the regiment most needed. Planning for Operation Whisky Mak began in utmost secrecy. Even the troops and junior officers were not informed until the last minute about where they would be heading. The operation would end with Afxentiou’s death.

Petros was arrested on Friday, 1 March and sent to 3 Infantry Brigade HQ for questioning. He produced information which led next day to the discovery of two pistols a short distance outside the Monastery walls and then, at approximately 16.30 on the same day, the Dukes received a signal from Brigade ordering a snatch party to stand by and that a guide was being brought by road to Battalion HQ.

Captain J Newton of 1 Dukes assembled a small party and was ready to set off when Major Rodick arrived with Petros. He agreed to lead the party to a hide to which Afxentiou and his four gang members had moved from the Monastery at 22.00 hrs on 27 February, and where he thought they still were.

A Duke of Wellington’s convoy struggles through the snow in the Troodos.

It was immediately apparent that Captain Newton's patrol would need to be strengthened, as almost certainly Afxentiou would fight if cornered. Major D M Harris, in whose company area the hide was said to be located, was given command of the operation.

Guests of an Abbot

UNKNOWN to the regiment, Afxentiou, with a 25-man gang, had been the guests of Abbot Irineos who was in charge of the 12th century monastery, for several weeks. He had stayed there to convalesce from the bullet wound he had received during his escape from Zoopiyi when a snatch squad arrived on New Year’s Eve.

Visitors to the monastery had not noticed Afxentiou disguised as a senior priest, one of four who lived there. There were also four young deacons and three novices.

Abbot Irineos had even given his bed to the guerilla leader to rest.

Most mornings, the gang left before dawn to improve one or other of several nearby hideouts they were building, but, according to Irineos, on the night of Friday 1 March they left early, round about midnight.

The Makhaeras Monastery and Abbot Irineos, for historical reasons, were not under the jurisdiction of Archbishop Makarios, who was still in exile in the Seychelles, but Ireneos operated an effective communications network to keep Grivas informed of what was taking place in the vicinity.

Irineos, who spoke excellent English learned during his RAF service in Nicosia during WW2, told the Greek Cypriot historian Doros Alastos why Afxentiou suddenly left. ‘There were rumors that there'd been another betrayal,’ he said. ‘When they'd left, I sat writing my report-for higher up, you know.'

Late that Friday evening, his report complete, Irineos prepared for bed, ‘when he heard the sound of approaching cars. He threw the report in the stove, sprinkled pepper outside his room to throw the dogs off the scent, and hastily jumped between the sheets. Soon the door burst open,’ says Alastos.

An officer of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment entered. He shouted: 'We know you've got him here. It's too late for any of your lies.'

Makhaeras Monastery was taken over by 1 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment as an operational headquarters. Note the large number of parked military vehicles.

The Abbot protested the invasion of his monastery, but was told he and the place would now be guarded by British troops round-the-clock and it would be easier for all if he talked. He still steadfastly refused to answer any questions, Meanwhile, his monks, priests and novices were rounded up from their cells in the two-storeys of cloisters that surrounded the courtyard. They were brought together and locked in a single room.

At first light, soldiers began their search of the monastery and surrounding slopes. They found nothing incriminating or clues to Afxentiou’s whereabouts.

‘When we found Afxentiou was no longer in the monastery, we could only make two guesses,’ said Brigadier Balfour. ‘Either he had gone out of the area or else he was underground. And since we had started Whisky Mak, we decided to continue on the assumption he was still around.’

(The authorities in Nicosia later discovered Afxentiou and Abbot Irineos had received a warning phone call from a source in Nicosia about the ‘top secret’ operation to capture EOKA’s No 2. An investigation was conducted, but the informer wasn’t found.)

The author can reveal George Lagoudontis-code name: Kiotis - was responsible. He was a Special Branch Inspector based in the Operations Room at Police HQ. Using hidden microphones, he tape-recorded conversations between officials, including an Army Brigadier and an Assistant Chief Constable, at meetings held every day at 09.00.)

‘Get Afxentiou’

THAT evening, towards sunset, Petros, the shepherd, revealed the approximate position of where he thought Afxentiou was hiding. He had resisted threats, but not the financial reward he was offered.

After careful consideration Lt. Colonel G Laing, Commanding Officer of 1 Dukes, directed that Afxentiou was to be taken at first light the next day - 3 March, a Sunday - as he considered a march across unknown country with no moon, heavy rain and with a guide (Petros), whose reliability was an unknown factor, might well fail to reach the correct objective or prove so noisy that the quarry would have time to escape.

He said he had a strong feeling that if Afxentiou were intending to move that night he would already have done so and that, therefore, nothing would be lost by waiting until dawn.

Planning the move forward proved extremely difficult as neither Major Harris nor anyone else knew the area in which Petros stated the hide would be found and Petros himself proved extremely dull and slow-witted, with absolutely no idea of distance or time.

In addition he spoke no English so that all questioning had to be done through an interpreter.

As an example of the difficulties encountered, Petros stated again and again that the hide ‘is somewhere between up there and down here’, pointing to the mountain slope towering above him and stretching hundreds of feet into a deep valley. Pressed to be specific, he said it was in a small isolated wood. When it was eventually found. it was concealed in thick scrub and brushes with not a tree near it.

A contemporary sketch map of the attack on Afxentiou-s hideout.

Having established the approximate location of the hide a plan of attack was rapidly drafted and agreed by the Regiment’s Commanding Officer.

A cut-off party set off at 04.00 and took up a position approximately 100 yards north of the hide, covering the track and stream, which flowed down from the suspected location. This was considered to be the only likely, or indeed practicable, escape route.

They were followed at 04.55 by two snatch parties and two Bren gunners who approached the hide from the east.

About 300 yards from the hide, the Bren gunners took up positions to cover the general area, while the two snatch parties separated and approached their objective in a pincer movement from north and south.

In addition, a small party, under RSM Randall, moved off at first light and took up a position on the slopes on the opposite side of the valley, in case anyone should attempt to escape in that direction and to observe any unusual movements.

The planners confidently felt that no one would attempt to breakout up the valley to the north, as this led back to the Monastery, where Battalion HQ was now located, or directly into the area occupied by B Company.

Finally, Colonel Laing arranged for a helicopter to carry Major Davis and a soldier to fly over the area to be in position to follow any escapees and stop them by fire from the air.

A trap is set

AFTER an extremely difficult cross-country march over precipitous slopes, at approximately 05.30, just before first light, point X was reached The troops expected that they would be able to see the exact location of the hide from this position, but the contours of the ground made it impossible.

As the light increased, however, Petros was able to point out the general area of the hide some 300 yards down the slope to the front.

Parties ‘A’ and ‘B’ now worked round the flanks to the area indicated by Petros.

Major D M Harris, who commanded the operation.

They met up at approximately 06.00 and were joined by Major Harris, coming down the slope from the two Bren gun positions.

At this point Petros lost his nerve and decided not to go any further. He told his escorts that he was unable to identify the exact location of the hide, only the approximate area (marked ‘Y’ on the sketch map above).

A quiet search of the general area began. Almost immediately Cpl. Trinder of ‘B’ party noticed a small track running up the hill from the lower path. He followed the track for about 10 yards and then spotted footprints. He looked more closely and noticed that the branches of the bushes to the right of the path had been tied down to form an archway about four feet high.

He walked inside the archway to investigate and saw some unusually large stones on the ground. He moved them carefully aside and found the mouth of a 40-gallon drum lying on its side, buried in the slope of the hill.

There was a 2-inch mortar wrapped up in brown paper inside the drum. Cpl. Trinder's finds confirmed that terrorists were, or had been, in the immediate area, and led to the next stage, which was the discovery of the hide.

The helicopter began circling. It signaled back a request for a platoon to cordon off the area while those present on the ground conducted a more thorough search.

It was approximately 06.15 and Captain Newton began walking the small track from where the oil drum had been hidden. From his foot falls he felt the ground below was hollow. Cpl. Trinder agreed.

Moving aside another unusual sized stone, he found the entrance to a tunnel no more than 18 inches wide and 18 inches high.

Captain Newton and Cpl. Trinder looked inside and saw clothing, but nothing else. They concluded the place was empty.

Shortly afterwards they were joined by some other soldiers and the unit’s interpreter. Then they heard voices from deep inside.

Four surrender

THE inmates were immediately ordered in Greek by 2Lt John Grant: ‘Come out of the hide, leave your arms behind.’

Realizing his hiding place had been discovered, Afxentiou ordered his four comrades to surrender. ‘We can't do anything,’ he told his gang. It was useless for them, he said, to throw their lives away. He himself would stay and fight it out. They asked what he planned and he replied: ‘I must die... I must die... I must die.’

A shout of ‘Endaxi’ came from the hide and four men crawled out slowly into the morning light. They offered no resistance. They were Avgoustis Efstathiou (also known as Matrosis), Andreas Stylianou, Feidias Symeonidis and Antonis Papadopoulos.

Avgoustis Efstathiou (on the left) and Andreas Stylianou (on the right) await questioning.

Andreas Stylianou with his captors face the media.

Each was paraded in front of the press who had been invited by confident officers to watch the capture of the terrorists.

Efstathiou told the journalists: ‘They found us this morning at 3.30 and when we heard a helicopter we knew we hadn-t a chance. We were all asleep except Afxentiou.’

‘A clatter of stones woke us up. Someone was sliding down the slope above us. Then we heard a shout: “Come out and surrender - leave your weapons behind.”’

‘Afxentiou told us to go and we obeyed. I was surprised when he didn't follow us. Perhaps he expected the troops to be satisfied with four of us, giving him a chance to escape. Perhaps he had already decided to fight it out. I’m not sorry it's all over. I've been 14 months in the mountains. But I have never killed anybody I'm a patriot.’

A soldier dies

THEN there was a sudden burst of automatic fire from the hide entrance. The first bullets went aimlessly into the bushes. 2Lt Grant shouted again in Greek for the hide’s occupant to give himself up. Cpl Peter Brown added: 'It's all up. You may as well come out. You are surrounded.' Afxentiou answered by firing his Sten directly at Brown and knocked him backwards, mortally wounded.

Captain Newton moved closer to the hide-s entrance, threw in a grenade, the only one in the unit-s possession, and ran quickly away before it exploded. There was a big bang, the ground trembled and smoke poured from the roof.

‘You’ve killed him,’ screamed Efstathiou. There was silence from inside. The only sound came from the falling rain and the clatter of a helicopter hovering above. ‘It was too dangerous to go near the hideout,’ said 2Lt Grant. ‘We just sat round and kept an eye on it. Every now and again a grenade would come hurtling out, and sometimes a burst of fire.’

On the track above the hide, officers held a council of war. Having lost one man, they agreed not to risk any more lives.

2Lt Middleton, who headed the detachment, grabbed Efstathiou by his collar and pushed him forward, ordering him back inside to persuade Afxentiou, if he were still alive, to give up without causing any further casualties. If his leader were dead, he was to bring out the body.

Reluctantly Efstathiou did as he was told. Fearful for his own life as he approached, he shouted: ‘Chief, don’t shoot. It’s me, Matrosis.’ He went inside and found Afxentiou losing blood from severe neck and knee wounds.

Nothing happened for several seconds and then the troops heard a single shot and wondered if Afxentiou had killed his comrade. Suddenly Afxentiou shouted out in English, ‘Now we are two. Come and get us.’ In Greek, he defiantly added: Molon Lave or ‘Come and get.’ This was a response given to the Persians by the Ancient Greek King Leonidas I during the Battle of Thermopylae.

All hopes of a peaceful resolution ended as Afxentiou and now Efstathiou fired at the soldiers.

A failed escape

INSIDE the hide, according to Efstathiou, the two men discussed the prospects of their survival and the part they had played in the EOKA conflict. He claimed Afxentiou told him: ‘The flame we lit years ago has spread through the hearts of all Greeks. Nothing can extinguish it now. Freedom will not be long in coming, for our death will fan the flames still higher.’

The minutes passed and the two considered how to escape. Afxentiou said he would throw a phosphorous grenade towards the British soldiers and then they could rush out, firing, and head into the forest and hide until darkness fell.

The grenade was hurled, exploded and yellow smoke obscured the entrance, but Efstathiou’s Sten gun failed to fire. In his panic, he had left the safety catch on. Major Rodick and Cpl Trinder and L/Cpl. Martin returned fire and kept it up until the smoke dispersed. Neither Afxentiou or Efstathiou had managed to get away.

In the ensuing confusion L/Cpl. Dowdall tried to drag Cpl. Brown’s body away from the hide, but after moving him a short distance came under more heavy fire from the two terrorists and had to abandon his attempt.

The two Duke of Wellington’s Bren gunners were now called forward and put in position, approximately 30 to 40 yards above the hide, covering the entrance.

‘Kill him’ order

THE officers took stock and made the following appreciation:

First, the captured terrorists had told them that Afxentiou had two machine-guns, a large quantity of ammunition, three pistols and a number of bombs in the hide with him.

Secondly, previous information, and Afxentiou’s present actions, indicated he was likely to make a suicidal last stand with the object of killing as many as possible. Furthermore, it would be quite easy for him to lob a grenade out of the entrance, which could cause severe casualties to anyone standing on top of or above the hide, while doing little or no damage to those inside.

Thirdly, the hide was surrounded and escape virtually impossible. In these circumstances, the risk of remaining on the hide’s roof was considered unacceptable and so the party withdrew to the upper track, while deciding how to capture or eliminate the enemy.

At 07.15, the Commander, 3 Infantry Brigade, and the Duke of Wellington’s CO arrived by helicopter. They ordered the death of Afxentiou before any further casualties were suffered.

The best means to achieve this objective were either to burn him out using petrol or by detonating a heavy charge on top of the hide.

A request was made for 50 gallons of petrol and Avgas as well as the assistance of a Royal Engineer.

Petrol and Avgas cans were loaded on Sycamore helicopters and flown to a landing site close to the terrorists’ hide.

At 07.45, No. 10 Platoon, ‘D’ Company, arrived at the scene and formed an outer cordon, with two additional Bren guns covering the immediate area of the hide.

Meanwhile, four patrols from 3 Company, Grenadier Guards, attached to 3 Brigade for the operation, set out for the battle site, with 1 Company holding the cordon. Royal Engineers set up searchlights to illuminate the area by reflecting their beams off low cloud. Extended lines of Guardsmen waded through undergrowth as rain continued to pour down. Lt Col Britten's party, which included Major P H Haslett, Lt W L A Nash, and RSM C White, traveled in two Land Rovers.

During the short lulls between exchanges of fire, bushes around the hide were cut down.

‘Burn the hide’

AT approximately 09.00, a mule-train arrived carrying petrol and this was thrown over the suspected area from the upper path and ignited, slightly south of the hide’s entrance, but failed to burn out the terrorists. Rain, interspersed with showers of hailstones, had stopped the bushes burning properly.

Fifteen minutes later an RE officer reached the scene of the operation with various explosives. He decided that 6lbs of ‘plastic’ would be enough to blow away the hide’s roof. The explosive was detonated, but the roof stayed firmly in its place. For their part, the men inside threw out more grenades.

For the next three hours there was a standoff between the well-protected terrorists tossing the occasional grenade and the attacking British forces laying down harassing Bren gun fire.

At noon, Avgas and more petrol arrived and this was thrown with great effect by Captain Hoppe onto an area a few yards further north than that previously fired. The petrol flowed down the slope and down cracks into the hide, soaking the terrorists. As soon it was ignited, a sheet of flame engulfed Afxentiou and Efstathiou.

Captain Hoppe runs from near the hide before the petrol is set alight and explodes.

‘Don’t be afraid,’ Afxentiou shouted as he tried to put out the fire. The British troops heard screams from the hide and watched a man, his hair ablaze, stagger out into a neighboring clump of bushes. The combination of grenades, explosives, tear gas and Avgas appeared to have finally settled the matter.

The DWR’s four Bren gunners immediately opened fire.

Watched by troops, civilian police and the press, the ammunition exploded seconds later.

Now, under the command of former Rugby International Captain Dennis Shuttleworth, a small party armed with Sten guns moved forward and were directed to the smoking hide by Captain Newton. Shuttleworth volunteered to lay another charge above the entrance.

Foot by foot he edged himself down the mountain slope. One false step and he would have slid past the hideout and become a sitting target. Slowly and precisely he put a ‘beehive’ in position. Gingerly he crawled back to the track, trailing a length of fuse behind him. Someone produced a box of matches from a sodden jacket. Shuttleworth lit the fuse.

A shattering roar reverberated throughout the mountains. The Grenadier Guards heard it in Makhaeras monastery.

It was 13.30.

Shuttleworth’s men threw a tear gas bomb inside and sprayed gunfire through the entrance.

The man who had run out earlier in flames was found lying in bushes not far away. He was in extreme pain and terrified. It was Efstathiou. ‘Do not shoot, I surrender,’ he repeated. Before being removed for medical attention at RAF Akrotiri, he insisted Afxentiou was dead.

His statement could not be verified immediately because the hide was still burning. The area was cordoned and the flames put out. As there was a possibility of some munitions remaining inside, the CO of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment decided a proper search would take place next day, when Afxentiou’s remains would be recovered for identification.

‘The Battle of Makhaeras’ was over at 14.00.

Body recovered

THAT night Grivas was told of Afxentiou’s death. He replied coldly: 'Why are you so sad? People get killed in a war, and that is what we are fighting. We shall have many more as brave as he.’

By Monday, 4 March, the news of Afxentiou’s last stand was known Island-wide. The operation had played out in front of press reporters and newsreel cameramen, who had been allowed to interview officers and captives alike, in the hope EOKA would believe its time was up. Instead the media coverage contributed to the making of a legend.

At Afxentiou’s native village of Lysi, shops closed for the day and the authorities were forced to impose a curfew on males from 12 to 27. In Famagusta town the gymnasium’s schoolboys refused to attend classes as a mark of respect and because one of their teachers, Antonis Papadopoulos, was one of those who had been captured.

During the search that took place on 4 March, Afxentiou's charred body was finally recovered. One leg was completely severed and there was a gaping hole in his skull.

Alongside him was a copy of Kazantzakis’ Christ Recrucified, its flyleaf bore the name of Abbot Irineos. Afxentiou had borrowed the book when he left the Abbot's room in the monastery.

The book with Irineos’s name was the final confirmation that the Abbot had collaborated with EOKA. He was detained and Makhaeras monastery was occupied by 11 Grenadier Guardsmen under the command of Lt Robin Dixon, the son of Lord and Lady Glenloran.

The guardsmen were rotated weekly, because this duty was much sought after the heat of the central plain round Nicosia, where they were usually camped. As the days passed, the authorities added to the monastery’s population by transferring a dozen priests from detention centers where they had been held under the Emergency Regulations for aiding and abetting terrorists.

An heroic suicide?

PIERIS, Afxentiou’s father, was allowed to see his son’s remains in the mortuary, but showed little emotion in front of his military escorts. He told them the remains were not those of his son and insisted he was alive and continuing the struggle. Later, Pieris broke down in tears and confessed to friends: ‘I knew it was him, but I didn’t want the dogs to see me crying.’

The pathologist at the British Military Hospital, Nicosia, conducted a post mortem on the body. Later at the Coroner’s hearing, Mr. Justice Ellison, was satisfied beyond any doubt that the terrorist had died from a gunshot wound through the skull, that death was instantaneous and had occurred before the body was burnt. The evidence suggested the bullet had been fired directly at the head.

Efstathiou, called to give evidence, changed the story he had told his captors, saying instead that Afxentiou was still alive when he had escaped the hide. Under cross-examination by counsel for Afxentiou’s parents, he insisted his leader had never contemplated suicide.

The Coroner's verdict was that Afxentiou died from a gunshot wound caused by a bullet’s explosion due to the intense heat in the hideout, but many people believe death was at Afxentiou’s own hand. It was, they said, his way of ending his life, rather than dying on the gallows.

The authorities knew that if Afxentiou were to have a public funeral, it would end in riots and probably deaths among mourners and the forces of law and order. They decided instead to bury his body in an unmarked grave in the grounds of Nicosia’s Central Prison, alongside those of hanged EOKA members.

His grave remains there, a shrine honored by Greek Cypriot youth, educated to believe him a martyr in the cause of freedom.

A ceasefire ordered

BUT on Monday, 4 March 1957, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the Governor, shed no tears. In his address to his soldiers, he said ‘These successes have made a very big impact on the whole campaign and they have come at a very opportune time. Well done, very well done indeed.’

Whatever may have been the mood of the Greek Cypriots about Afxentiou, Grivas was very aware that his organization had been wrong-footed by Operations Black Mak and Whisky Mak, whatever stirring words he spread.

Both sides now stepped up their propaganda campaigns. The Government-controlled radio station, said Grivas, was quoting ‘forged letters attacking us, purporting to come from anonymous priests, sorrowing mothers, bereft widows and "true patriots". We countered this poisonous rubbish by leaflet and word of mouth. I ended a typical proclamation with the words: "Let us give one more slap to the unblushing cheek of the tyrant. Let us write across the length and breadth of our country, All for the freedom of Cyprus!"’

Charles Foley, the editor of The Times of Cyprus, a newspaper not unsympathetic to the independence struggle, aptly wrote: ‘Both in town and countryside EOKA's defense was penetrated by small, highly mobile forces with great resourcefulness and few inhibitions. They had seized the element of surprise and were hoisting EOKA with its own petard.’ But Grivas promised the battle would continue with greater intensity in spite of the organization’s losses and appointed Antonis Georghiades as his second-in-command to replace Afxentiou.

In Athens, the Greek Government did not share Grivas’s view and warned the aggressive colonel to stop and allow time for the UK’s new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and other leaders to discuss peaceful moves to end the conflict.

Grivas was obliged to order a ceasefire on 14 March 1957. It would be short-lived, but gave the Island a respite from violence.

After Cyprus gained independence, the Greek Cypriot historian Nicos Pittas declared: 'If we were truthful with ourselves, we would admit that for all their bravery and idealism, the EOKA fighters were engaged in a struggle for a goal that was strategically misguided and unachievable, using methods, including terrorizing civilians, that were extreme and unnecessary and in many ways counter-productive to achieving the realistic goal of an independent and democratic bi-communal republic.'

Aftermath

TODAY there many streets in Cyprus named after Afxentiou. A monument has been erected to his memory and a small museum dedicated to him in the Makhaeras monastery.

His hideout, one kilometer below, has become a shrine and a place of pilgrimage called the Krisfigeto tou Afxentiou. A massive figure of him, legs akimbo, stands high above, guarded by a huge sculpted eagle.

In 2005, the then President of (Greek) Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, himself an EOKA member, awarded medals and diplomas of service to 21,000 individuals for allegedly taking part in the conflict. The medal carries Afxentiou’s image.

A Greek Cypriot student admits, however: ‘It’s common knowledge that at that time the real fighters were only a few hundred. One must have the courage to say the truth because I am sure that some of the people who claim honors about their EOKA activity never actually participated in any way.’

The EOKA medal - thousands were minted

In London, the Greek Cypriot community pays annual tribute to his courage at a memorial service in the Church of St Demetrios in Edmonton.

1 DWR remember the loss of Corporal Peter Brown from Leeds and two staunch members of the Police Special Branch: Bill Sharp and Joe Mounsey, who so often accompanied the Battalion on its searches for terrorists.

Bill Sharp became a Detective Chief Superintendent in the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary and Joe Mounsey, a Detective Chief Inspector in the Lancashire Constabulary. Mounsey was with 1 DWR, when Afxentiou's hide was found. In the early 1960s he was an investigating officer in the Moors' Murder Case.

Of the four terrorists who survived the battle, all received long prison sentences, but were released when agreements were reached for the independence of Cyprus.

Andreas Stylianou (standing behind Grivas) kept a very low profile after independence, returning to Lagoudera, his home village, to resume his life as a farmer. He began his EOKA career as a courier in the Madari and joined Afxentiou in October 1956. He gave his first interview on 3 March 1987, 30 years after Afxentiou’s death, at a school gathering. His account of the Macheras operation appears in a 10-page booklet by Spanos, the official EOKA historian. Stylianou was still alive in 2008.

Phidias Symeonides, a very proud man, also withdrew from normal life, built a small house on the outskirts of Nicosia at Anthoupoli. He earned a bare living by working occasionally as a waiter at the Spanos restaurant in Ayios Dhometios. Asked why he did not seek any favors from the Greek Cypriot authorities-as many others did-for the ‘services’ provided as an EOKA fighter, he always replied: ‘They know where I am and if they want to help me they know where to find me.’ He became very ill and wanted to move to the clear air of the Troodos. Several days after his death, his body was found lying in the yard of his house, completely forgotten by the Makarios Government.

Antonios Papadopoulos is no longer alive. An athlete and a skilled footballer, he became the captain of Anorthosis, a Famagusta football team. A stadium in Larnaca commemorates his name. The man who had a £5,000 on his head ended his days as a school headmaster.

Augustus Efstathiou, the onetime hawker in Ledra Street, was rewarded by a senior position in the Republic’s new Cyprus Police force and lives on a state pension today. He has become a celebrity in Greek Cyprus by exploiting his connection to Afxentiou, making speeches and appearing regularly on television. He declined to be interviewed by BSW. A friend suggested he was concerned his ‘image’ could be harmed.

Vasilou Afxentiou, Gregoris’s wife, was ignored by EOKA after the conflict was over. To survive, she worked in the fields of their village and later as a housemaid and cleaner. She later re-married.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

The various Duke of Wellington parties named above were organized as follows:

Commander: Major D M Harris.

Party ‘A’ (Snatch Party): Lt. E J H Dasent, Sgt. J Mounsey (Special Branch, Cyprus Police), Petros (guide), 2/Lt. G Middleton (RNF. interpreter), Cpl. Brown, L/Cpl. Dowall, L/Cpl. Martin

Party ‘B’ (Snatch Party): Captain J M Newton, Major E L Rodick (Com. Intelligence Wing), and Inspector W Sharpe. (CID, Cyprus Police), Cpl. Trinder, Pte. Riley, Pte. Bramham

Party ‘C’ (Bren Gunners): Lt. C M Wood, Pte. Seymour.

Party ‘D’ (Cut-off Party): 2/Lt. T D Sugden and two ORs.

When Afxentiou’s hide was searched, troops found:

2 x Thompson sub-machine-guns
6 x magazines (4 full and 2 half-full).
1 x Brevete automatic pistol and one magazine.
1 x Bretta automatic pistol and one magazine.
1 x Smith and Wesson .38 pistol.
3 x homemade grenades.

Rounds:

55 x .45 mm.
19 x.38 mm
12 x 9 mm
2 x spent .45 mm
1 x head, body, fins 2-in. Hemor bomb (exploded).

1 x American bayonet.
1 x belt, with holster and ammunition pouch.
2 x pairs binoculars and, strangely,
1 x dental plate from BMH, Nicosia.

Acknowledgements:
This article was prepared from material published in The Iron Duke, The Journal of the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment; Cyprus Guerrilla by Doros Alastos (Published by Heinmann, London); The Memoirs of General Grivas, edited by Charles Foley (Published by Longmans, London); and contemporary issues of The Cyprus Mail.

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