Malayan Communist Party
1948-1960

1: The cause of the Communist Insurgence

2: The development of the Malayan Communist Party

3:  The Battlefield of Malaya

4:  Insurrection 1948

5:  Insurrection Part 2

6:  The Communist Plan

The Cause of the Communist Insurgence

The Communist Party suffered from being regarded with relative indifference by the general population, due to the relative prosperity of the current regime. Throughout China and the Pacific-Asian region the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party waged the same war that had been going on since the early 1920s in China. The Malayan Communist Party came into being when the Chinese-led Nanyang Communist Party dissolved in April 1930. The MCP, as it was known, stated that its intention was to work for a Soviet Republic of Malaya, and at the same time sponsor Communism in both Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. Differences in opinion existed between the Communist agents and the Chinese Communist leaders. The former wanted membership to be open to anyone and the latter to retain its original form: a Chinese Communist movement that simply happened to be sited in Malaya and Singapore amongst the transient Chinese population. Most of this transient population was trying to amass a fortune before returning to China to live in comfort. The Comintern agents had their way, but only a few hundred Indians and virtually no Malayans opted to join the party.

The new MCP was almost wiped out before it started. In June 1931 a senior Comintern agent was sent to Singapore to discipline the MCP and ensure it followed faithfully Moscow-directed doctrinal lines. The agent was arrested by the police. Papers in his possession disclosed almost full details of both the MCP organisation and the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. The arrested agent was also believed to have made a confession which supplemented this information, enabling police to arrest all the prominent members of the MCP in Malaya and Singapore as well as many Communists in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Ho Chi Minh was one of those arrested and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The information gained from this agent put MCP membership at about 15 000, with an additional 10 000 active sympathisers in local organisations and trade unions. It was a full twelve months before the MCP recovered enough to operate again. Contact with the Comintern was lost - along with the small amount of financial aid it had supplied. The Comintern Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai was also broken up, leaving most of the Pacific regions Communist elements to fend for themselves for the time being.

The MCP, after weeding out its weaker members, conducted a show of strength, organising industrial subversion and a large strike at the Batu Arang coal mine in Selangor. A prompt dispatch of soldiers and police brought the situation under control. During this period the MCP remained completely illegal and unregistered with the governments.

In 1935 Communist policies turned their attention toward Fascist regimes (such as Germany) at the expense of their actions against Western democracies, such as Britain and France. This respite gave the MCP time and breathing space to build up its resources and to form a sound organisation.

Throughout this period, Britain did not interfere directly with the control of its regimes. Britain's policy was biased towards the native Malayans. This created very little opportunity for Communist feeling to grow among the Malayan population. Most of the Communist members were people of Chinese stock, brought in as labour in the tin mines and rubber estates. The native Malayans were, in general, content as small farmers and fishermen. They had sufficient for their needs and had no inclination to take on this sort of heavy work. Many of the Chinese and Indian labourers regarded their stay in Singapore and Malay as temporary, for work purposes.

The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 saw the Communists rush, in a surge of patriotic feeling, to raise funds for a joint Communist/Nationalist defence of their homeland. In reality, the Communists did little, and allowed the Nationalists take the losses. During this time, the Comintern turned its attention back towards the Western democracies.

In 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Communists everywhere were ordered to ease subversive activities against the Western democracies and turn their attention and resources solely against the Axis powers. Although the MCP did finally comply with this instruction, it remained committed to working for a Soviet republic of Malaya as soon as the war was over.

In Autumn 1941 the British had brought in a few sabotage and guerrilla experts to train others for 'behind-the-lines' activities, should the Japanese succeed in overrunning the British. The few discerning strategists noted that defenses for Singapore and Malaya were negligible. What was available was totally obsolete and numerically inadequate. Those troops in the country had no training in jungle warfare, and they clung to the roads, avoiding the depths of the forests.

On 8 December 1941 Japanese troops landed at Kota Bahru and began to advance down the peninsula. On the same day, Singapore was bombed. The MCP made another offer of assistance and the government released all left-wing political prisoners on 15 December. It was agreed that elements of the MCP would be armed and trained by the British, and would operate under British control in the jungle behind enemy lines. This arrangement was made in very dramatic 'cloak and dagger' circumstances between British officers and MCP representatives. The MCP was still an illegal organisation, and Lai Teck and other prominent Communists were reluctant to come forward openly. They preferred to remain in the shadows, or to adopt a disguise, pretending to be their own emissaries. The meeting resulted in no political advantages for the MCP, and none seem to have been offered.

A special jungle and sabotage training centre, known as the 101st Special Training School (101st STS), which had Existed in a dormant embryo form for some time, was quickly made ready to train men sent by the MCP. Before Malaya was overrun, the STS was able to run seven courses, giving 165 Chinese Communists sabotage and guerilla training. These students formed the basis of the Malayan resistance force during the period of the Japanese occupation.

On 21 December, the MCP announced that it would do all in its power to unite the people - Malayan, Chinese and Indian - against the Japanese; to eliminate all fifth-column elements; and to wage an all-out war of resistance and sabotage in the areas under Japanese control. The original plans had envisaged that each guerilla body would be led by a British officer, to ensure that British instructions and policy were carried out. As this was not possible, the Chinese students of the 101st STS were hurriedly sent out to work on their own behind Japanese lines. These groups were ill-equipped and ill-armed. The regular forces had absolute priority and were themselves short of arms and equipment. But none complained or refused to go. The first class of the 101st STS went to Selangor, the second to Negi Sembilan and the third north to Johore. In late January 1942 others were infiltrated through Japanese lines, which were pressing close to Singapore. When Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, the MCP was left to fend for
itself.

Within a very short time, with the Chinese Communist students from the 101st STS as a nucleus, four armed resistance groups became active. These ultimately developed into the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), although it was not formally known by that title until March 1942. Some of these 'Regiments' were reinforced by British and Indian stragglers from the fighting, and had some luck in obtaining weapons from the retreating British.

Their first operations were badly planned and poorly executed. The infant MPAJA was coming up against Japanese regulars, first-rate experienced jungle troops, who had carried out the conquest of Malaya and Singapore and who had been kept in the country as insurance against the possibility of a Malayan or Chinese rising. Many MPAJA operations failed hopelessly. The Japanese troops were quick to react and hit back, causing many MPAJA casualties, and the loss of precious arms.

These operations drew the attention of the Japanese to the MPAJA, which was the only force in the country with the ability to raise an armed force. The Japanese accordingly began to search the MPAJA out and destroy it. They were particularly brutal in their treatment of the Chinese population, with several thousand executed for little reason. Despite the torture and executions, the Japanese were unable to gain much information about the MPAJA or MCP members, as so few Chinese knew anything about it. MCP members, and suspected members, were killed when they fell into Japanese hands. These terror operations caused many Chinese to flee into the jungle fringes and join the stragglers who were already there following the trade slump of the mid-thirties.

The regiments of the MPAJA were forced into the jungle by the Japanese Occupation troops, and to prevent informers giving them away. Many Malays were, if not exactly pro-Japanese, at least anti-Chinese and the Japanese-sponsored police force was manned by Malays. Japanese troops conducted regular sweeps of the jungle, which resulted in many MPAJA casualties. All prisoners taken were killed. Food was obtained from squatters on the jungle fringes and also from Chinese in the towns, rubber estates and mines, which provided the MPAJA with a base of sympathetic suppliers.

During this period the MPAJA learned to live in the jungle. It lost many members to disease, madness and insubordination, most examples of which were deviation from Communism or attempts to desert. The MPAJA members were often short of food, and ill with fever, dysentery or beri-beri. Most of the British and Indian stragglers died of disease. This period sharpened the MPAJA into a force able to live, and fight, in the jungle. But it was a hard and costly way to learn.

After this period, the MPAJA was able to consolidate its position, as the best Japanese troops left for service elsewhere. Those who remained were reluctant to venture into the jungle to ferret out the resistance fighters. By mid-1942 the MPAJA regiments had built up their numbers after the toll taken by the jungle and Japanese. Others regiments were formed and each regiment had its own Traitor Killing Unit, devoted to ferreting out and assassinating victims selected by the MCP. The 5th regiment's Traitor Killing Unit also went as far as eliminating local Chinese who refused to help the MPAJA, and even those who refused to join the MPAJA when asked, as well as suspected informants.

The 6th Regiment was largely a propaganda unit, which included the MPAJA academy. Its commander was reputed to have been a student at Mao Tse-tung's military and political school in Yenan. No lateral communication between regiments was permitted and all contacts were vertical, through the command structure.

The MPAJA was thoroughly political and Communist in nature, with strong indoctrination as well as military Exercises every day. Each Malayan state had its own State Central Executive Committee, recruiting for the MPAJA and Organising supplies. These were backed up by the new People's Anti-Japanese Federation, formed in February 1942. The MPAJA however, was unable to establish itself in Singapore. There, the back of the Communist organisation Had been broken in August 1942 when the Japanese conducted a purge of Communists. Consolidation continued until April 1943. The strength of the MPAJA rose to about 4 500, but members were still insufficiently armed. Most members were poor marksmen and as ammunition was carefully hoarded there was none available for target practice.

From May 1943 small Allied teams landed secretly on the coast of Malaya, where making contact with the MPAJA. The MCP, however, was reserving its strength for after the war and the parties had little contact with the MCP. Few Asians believed the British would ever return, but they needed any support the Allies could provide. The MPAJA was instructed by its leader, Lai Teck to protect the Allied parties, but to restrict their movements and tell them nothing. The MPAJA was determined not to commit itself at this stage of the war. Actual contact between Allied teams and the MCP did not occur until the last days of 1943. In early 1944 the Allies made an agreement with SEAC (South-East Asia Command), by which the Allies would provide supplies, money and training facilities on condition that the MPAJA would co-operate with the Allies against the Japanese. No political questions were asked. The MPAJA was to provide intelligence and guerilla support for the envisaged Allied invasion.

Through the spring and summer of 1944 few supplies could be brought to Malaya. The Allies did not have an aircraft capable of reaching the peninsula from their Indian bases and all supplies had to be transported by submarine. When the new MkIv Liberator entered service with SEAC in November 1944, the command was able to air-drop supplies to the guerillas. However, supplies were limited due to commitments elsewhere. After spring 1945 useful quantities began to arrive, and the MPAJA began to look like an army.

Throughout the war, co-operation with the MPAJA was poor and in some instances hostility existed. This was perhaps due, to a large degree, to the heavy political indoctrination.

The allied invasion of Malaya, scheduled for September 1945, never occurred as the Japanese surrendered on 16 August. The cease-fire came into effect the following day. This left a largely communist force, armed, equipped and organised, with nothing to do in Malaya as the British returned. There is some speculation as to whether the MPAJA would ever have actually been involved in fighting during an invasion. Their leaders wanted the MPAJA intact after the war in case of a Communist insurgence.

Japanese authorities, and their reports, state that the MPAJA was never considered a strategic threat to their Occupation forces and was barely a nuisance to the administration. The MCP had, in fact, been waiting for the Allies to win the war for them and consolidate their hold on the minds of the people. The MPAJA admitted that its Traitor Killing Squads killed over 2 542 Chinese, Malays, Indians and other nationalities.

The abrupt ending to the war meant that the MPAJA was able to confiscate large numbers of Japanese arms before the Allies Arrived, despite SEAC orders that they were to stay in the country until the cease-fire was confirmed by the local Japanese.

Within days, the MPAJA had effective control of most of the country. The Allies now realized that the MPAJA was out of their control. In an effort to handle the problem they made it an 'official' force, paying each member $30 (Malyan) a month, clothing and feeding them, and employing them on guard duties. Extra men were recruited and given the arms taken from the Japanese. The MPAJA expanded to over 6,000 members

Despite the Japanese brutality, there was little retaliation once the tables were turned but spasmodic reprisals against the Japanese controlled police force were frequent, varying in severity. The Traitor Killing Squads continue to operate. The MCP considered an immediate takeover of Malaya while there were few Allied troops there, but their leader, Lai Teck, appreciated what British reaction to such a move might be. There was a sizeable fleet in the Indian Ocean, the army in Burma, and the Americans in the Pacific, all still very much in war deployment against any about-turn by the Japanese. SEAC hurriedly landed more Allied troops before the Communist influenced MPAJA could change its mind, and took control of Malaya. A British Military Administration was established to govern the country until a civilian one could be restored. The Administration rapidly clamped down on MCP propaganda and
shut down newspapers that overstepped the mark in publishing left-wing propaganda.

Allied attempts to dismantle the MPAJA failed. Few members were allowed to leave, and arms were stolen from the Allied Force in Malaya. The Allies eventually ordered the MCP, now a legal political party, to disband the MPAJA. After some pressure the MCP gave way and disbanded the MPAJA. Its arms were handed over to the British.

The disbandment was carried out in an orderly fashion. The British authorities paid the MPAJA members for weapons which were handed in. However, the guerillas kept their pistols. The large discrepancy in the British estimates of Japanese captured arms, and what was actually surrendered at the disbandment of the MPAJA, was accounted for by the numbers hidden by the MPAJA in the jungle. There was nothing that the Authorities could do about this. Most were Japanese weapons, although there was a proportion of modern Allied weapons.

The disbandment left the MCP with a clandestine army of about 4 000 under arms and 6 800 officially disbanded. This secret army hid its arms and went underground in towns and villages. Very few MPAJA officers came forward, and these were only those who had been positively identified by the British.

The MCP also had firm control of the MPAJA 'Old Comrades Association', whose members were on recall at a moment's notice and were expected to support the secret army. The MCP now functioned openly as the People's Democratic Movement, although a secret organization, operated parallel to the Movement, prepared the way for the eventual insurrection against the British Authorities in Malaya.

In 1946 the MCP was still divided, some members wanting instant insurrection and others, including Lai Teck, advocating a more moderate line. The latter won, as the Americans were pressuring the European empires to give their colonies independence. They decided to wait for Malaya's turn. The British were not prepared to hand Malaya over to the MCP, which was the only political party with any effective strength and organisation.

In January 1946 the British Government published a White Paper proposing the establishment of a Malayan Union of eleven states, and a colony of Singapore. The Sultans were persuaded to agree to this. The Union would have a High Commissioner and Singapore would remain a Crown Colony with a Governor. The Proposal was pushed through and the government gradually given to the people under British supervision. The Civil Government took over from the British Military Administration in April 1946 and the Malayan Union was formally established. The Malay population was not impressed. It had lost its preferential treatment under the new laws, which gave equal status to all born in Malaya, and easy means of achieving citizenship for those not born in Malaya.

IN 1946 the MCP failed to gain support for an insurrection from foreign communist parties, including China who thought it inevitable that the British would pull out of Malaya as they were doing in Burma. They counselled patience to Lai Teck. Arguments between the two philosophies continued: militant action or passive political formations and strength-gathering. In 1947 Lai Teck failed to appear for a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the MCP. It was found he had in fact absconded with the bulk of MCP funds. Officially, he was never heard of again. Unofficially, he was reported to have been liquidated by a Traitor Killing Squad. No word of this momentous defection was announced, and Lai Teck was blamed for nearly everything that had gone wrong for the MCP when the states' own committees were informed in March 1948.

Lai Teck's successor was Chin Peng, the second-in-command in effect until Lai Teck's disappearance. He was elected Secretary-General of the MCP. He had served in the Occupation, had been in frequent contact with British officers and Allied personnel, and was a confirmed Communist. He was 27 years old in 1948 and had been awarded the OBE for his services during the occupation. (In fact, he never received this and the award was later revoked.) He spoke English, Malay and several Chinese dialects.

The moderate line had failed to yield Malaya to the MCP and Chin Peng decided it was time to take action before his party became demoralised. The policy of provoking labour unrest was at last being checked by the government. Some of the trade unions were also becoming tired of Communist domination and were suspicious of Communist motives. MCP policy was seen as too destructive and negative for many. The economy of the country was recovering, despite the MCPs best efforts, and workers wanted to be left alone to enjoy the prosperity and a better standard of living.

Chin Peng observed that the Communists in Greece and China were doing exceptionally well - and not too badly in French Indo-China either. He saw that the former great colonial empires were cracking and disintegrating, and that the British Empire in particular seemed to be falling apart. India had just become independent, and other colonies were clamoring to follow suit. He decided the moment had come. The moment for insurrection.
 
 

The secondary forest consists of clearings that have been allowed to revert to their natural state. The trees are not so tall or fully grown and there is invariably thick undergrowth, which inhibits movement. This really deserves the name of jungle, which is a loose expression applied to many of the parts of the country where the undergrowth is fairly thick.

The climate is tropical and humid, with just over 90 inches of rain annually, spread fairly evenly throughout the year, although the monsoon seasons are distinguishable. there is little variation in temperature over the months over the months. the equator lies only about 100 miles to the south of Singapore. Only the western part of the country had been developed to any extent. it contained most of the total of about 3.3 million acres of rubber estates (in 1939), then supplying about 40 percent of the world's rubber requirements, and over 700 tin mines, producing 25,000 tons of tin annually. A railway ran the length of the peninsula on the western side, as well as a good, all weather road. Another railway crossed the country diagonally to reach Kota Bahru in the north-eastern corner. There were many smaller road complexes, usually near towns, estates or mines. The rivers also served as a means of communications,
as well as the roads, rail and sea.

At the southern tip was the small, fortified island of Singapore, about 220 square miles in area, joined to the mainland by a three-quarter mile long causeway, which carried both a road and railway line.

Pre-war Malaya was made up of a number of political Federated and Unfederated states, and a Crown Colony. All of which were run by a Sultan, assisted by the Malayan Civil Service, the senior posts of which were held by British personnel. The Crown Colony was that of the Straits Settlements, which embraced Singapore, Penang and Malcca and was governed directly by Britain. The Federated and unfederated States had almost complete autonomy and were merely under British protection.

In late February 1948, Lau Yew, who had been charged with the military conduct of the Insurrection and was a keen student of Mao Tse-tungs works,began to form what would become the Malayan People's Anti-British Army (MPABA) but he immediately ran into unexpected snags. The first , he couldn't do it in complete secrecy which he did not anticipate. This brought unwelcome police attention, Malayan police intelligence was quite efficient and many Chinese communists, who should have been organizers of the MPABA, were arrested, and this retarded its formation. The second snag was that the reservists from the old MPAJA were reluctant to come forward when called. less than 1,000 of the estimated 10,800 reservists came when initially called up to form the core of the new MPABA. Strong arm tactics were used tobring the reluctant in, but they had trouble finding them. By the beginning of June the MPABA was barely 3,000 strong.

The MCP failed miserably to entice both Malayans and Indians to join, although there was a short-lived secret agreement with the left-wing Malay Nationalist Party, but police intervention and arrests crippled the latter, and brought the liaison to an end. The MCP probably had about 3,000 active party members in early 1948 and as many again were active helpers.

Throughout April, May and june the MCP terrorism ensued, and Malaya, Indian and Chinese employees of Europeans were threatened, beaten and sometimes killed to get them to desert their jobs. Several Chinese Nationalist leaders and personalities were assassinated. Large quantities of rubber were stolen and thousands of rubber trees slashed to prevent them yielding latex. Mining machinery was damaged and worker's hut burned. At this stage the MPABA was still recovering its arms from the secret caches in the Jungle and was not in a fit state to engage troops in guerilla warfare. The incidents of terrorism were far more numerous than those of guerilla activity.

The murder of three European planters on 16th june, 1948 near the small town of Sungei Spur, in Perak, brought matters to a head and resulted in the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, declaring an emergency in parts of Perak and Johore, which was extended to the whole of the country the next day. Many had urged this step for some time. The war had begun, the police were given extra powers of search, detention and of enforcing a curfew, and the armed forces were brought into help them. On July 23rd, the MCP was declared an unlawful society.

The MPABA did not engage the British armed forces, as it was insufficiently organized and incapable of doing so. And would not risk itself even if in overwhelming strength, as soon as it was able tit began to attack small village police stations, which usually had less than a dozen Malay policemen to defend them. Otherwise, they practiced terrorist activities and sabotage on machinery, plantations and communications.

On February st, 1948, the Malay Union had given way to the Malayan Federation, which restored the right to the Sultans. Also, federal citizenship gave more protection to the native Malaya, but much political damage had been done by the Malayan Union concept.

In country, the British and Malay armed force amounted to five British, Two Malay and Six Gurkha battalions. British artillery regiments were converted to an infantry role, and were referred to an infantry regiments. This practise was followed for the rest of the Emergency. The RAF had 100 aircraft in the country, and the federation Police numbered 10,223 nearly all Malays. The Military was commanded by Major-general C.H. Boucher, GOC Malayan District, who resisted calls for garrisons to be posted in all parts of the country. instead he used his troops to hit the guerrillas hard wherever he could find them, which in the opening weeks was fairly often. The RAF started working the guerrilla's over in June 1948, using Spitfires to Strafe the guerrillas and in August they started to bomb the insurgent camps.

The government had also taken countermeasures. They had formed a Special constabulary, into which some 24,000 Malaya were enrolled during the first three months of the emergency. They were given arms immediately and used primarily for guard duties, being trained when time permitted. This enabled the troops and police to conduct offensive operations from the beginning. Small defensive systems grew up around European offices, works and bungalows in the interior of the country, protected by bard wire fences and other devices, guarded by Special Constables. These measures encouraged the Europeans to stay put thwarted the first stage of the MCp insurgency plan.

The second measure was the introduction of identity cards issued to everyone over the age of 12 years, which had to be carried at all times, and a system of national registration. The MCP was bitterly opposed to this and the MPABA stooped people just to tear the cards up, The MCP also initiated an unsuccessful campaign to encourage people to destroy the cards. Owing to the frequent and rigorous police checks, the MCP upper hierarchy had to flee Singapore and the towns and go underground in the jungle.

Colonel W.N.Gary, who had been Inspector-General of the Palestine police, was appointed Commissioner of the Palestine Police, was appointed Commissioner of Malay Federation Police. Immediately he got arms for his men and had a radio-network established through all the police stations no matter how small, borrowing radio operators from the services until his men could operate the radios themselves. This enabled warning of communist attacks to be given so troops could be sent to help.

As a counter of the MCP, the government encouraged the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) whose professed objects were support of the Government in its efforts to preserve the peace and the fostering of good inter-communal relations. it rose to a membership of over 10,000 in twelve months, but was timorous and achieved little. The Chinese community could not be persuaded to form its own self-defence corps under Government sponsorship. The Chinese feared the squatters on the edge of the Jungle and doubted the governments ability to protect them if they came out against the Communists. The MCP committed acts of terrorism to frighten the leaders of the MCA, which remained in being despite this.

With the failure of stage one of the Insurgence plan, Lau Tew ordered an intensification of attacks on small police stations and European assets. Some of these were successful, others were not. typically they involved 200 or more communists attacking a police station defended by a sergeant and ten constables were a shambles, the communists suffered terrible casualties. They were also hit hard by the British and Gurkha troops , who aided by aircraft, were able to catch up with them on several occasions.

The newly-formed MPABA was in no fit state to be mount company-sized assaults. It had difficulty in just assembling the units in camps in the jungle and supplying them. There were few competent officers, the men were untrained, few knew how to handle their weapons their knowledge of tactics was non-existent, discipline was poor and morale was worse. In short the MPABA was suffering from bad or non-existent command , ability and organization.

Their opponent on the other had, were jungle trained British and Gurkha troops, a number of whom had served in Burma against the Japanese. They were trained, disciplined had effective command, supplies and air support from the RAF.

The dismal failure of the MPABA forced Lau Yew to force the issue in trying to gain a suitable location for its GHQ. He picked the small town of Kajang, to the south of Kuala Lampur in Sleangor, as a likely site. He began to assemble troops in the area, and was in the process of organizing an attack when he was killed in a clash with the Security Forces (The Armed forces, Special Constables and Home Guard) on 16th July 1948, a month after the Emergency had started. This was a bad blow for the MPABA, Lau yew was a competent military leader whereas Chin Peng was inexperienced having only been a junior officer in the MJALA in the Japanese occupation. The MPABA nearly shattered after his death, had action by the Security forces been intensified it would have disintegrated completely. unfortunately there was a Government 'pause'.

The 'pause' was caused by the death of High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent killed in an air accident in the UK on 2nd July, and the delay in announcing his successor had left the helm vacant during a critical period. Expected British reinforcement did not arrive as well. Although general Boucher conducted the war ably and energetically with what he had available more troops would have sealed the MPABA's fate.

At the end of July, the MPABA was in a dismal state it had no leader, it had no victories under its belt, moral was falling, desertions were increasing, it was untrained and losing men and had not even learnt how to cope in the jungle.

The 'pause' lasted two months and probably saved the MPABA. In August, the first two extra British units arrived, but by this time the MPABA had got over its teething troubles and was able to get by. A complete brigade arrived in October. In September, Sir Henry Gurney was appointed to be the new High Commissioner of the Malayan Federation. The pause was over, and the war against the insurgents intensified. Jungle warfare teams led by former Force 136 and Chindit officers under the title Ferret Force, located many of the insurgent camps and units, a number of Dyaks, Borneo head-hunters were attached to the force to aid the Security Forces who once a camp or unit was located were brought in for the kill. However, the Ferret Force had only a few months of life, owing to disagreements over policy, administration and methods. This again, was unfortunate, as this is the one certain method of countering guerilla warfare.

A sealed belt was established along the Thailand border in September 1948, but this was only two miles wide, and was only a partial obstacle to insurgents crossing the frontier. Elsewhere, the communist terror continued with frequent murders, vehicles being ambushed, and European installations attacked. The Special Constabulary, under the guidance of ex-Palestine policemen, guarded the Europeans and improved in efficiency. Hadreinforcements arrived earlier, or Ferret Force been allowed to continue operations, the MPABA would probably have lost the war in the first nine months.

On 1 February the MPABA changed its name to the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). This was designed to attract all races, and it was hoped that some Malays and Indians could be induced to join. The percentage of those races in the old MPABA was infinitesimal. A GHQ was established, but no commander named. The army was governed by a Central Military Committee which comprised the Politburo plus certain regional commanders and political officers.

Mobilisation was now considered to be complete and the MRLA began life with a strength of about 4 000 divided into ten regiments of uneven strengths, numbered serially. About 10 per cent of the personnel were women, mostly young dedicated communists who were used for teaching and propaganda purposes as much as for domestic camp work. These women, unlike those in the old MPAJA, were expected to accompany their units and join in the action. The MRLA had about 1 000 party members, mostly those members of the MPABA who had not been killed, wounded or deserted. All regiments of the MRLA were in jungle camps, some fairly close to the Chinese squatter camps, a source ofvolunteers to fill gaps in the ranks and a source of supplies. The army was now used to the jungle and had a strict communist-type discipline and military routine. They had ample arms, a reasonable supply of ammunition and enough food to sustain them. No support had arrived from either the Soviet Union or Red Chinese Communists.

With the army up to a workable standard and the MCP intelligence system providing information on Security Forces movements and intentions, the MCP now assumed that the conflict was in the protracted warfare stage. It would continue until such time as external aid was received from other Communist parties, or the Security Forces became distracted and worn down. The MCP continued to employ guerilla and terrorism tactics in the hope of gaining Liberated Areas as soon as possible. The plan was to overrun small village police stations. Ten villages close together would form a district, which would then be gradually enlarged into a region. A region would become a Liberated Area, and accordingly house a guerilla base.

The Insurgent army was supported by the clandestine Min Yuen, an underground organisation that provided money, food, intelligence and communications. It was centred in the Chinese population, largely amongst the squatters, although it also operated in Singapore and other cities and towns in Malaya. It consisted of a full-time controlling cadre of party members, with other members as part-time workers. Its exact strength was not known, but wild guesses estimated that it might have as many as 400 000 members. These have been discounted. In the early months of the Emergency the Min Yuen probably had a membership of between 30 000 and 40 000. Two main centres of Min Yuen activity were Penang Island and Johore Bahru, both with predominately Chinese populations. As well as sympathisers, many more were forced or threatened into helping the Min Yuen.

The Min Yuen's fluctuating success caused the MCP to reorganise it in Spring of 1949 and to define its tasks more clearly. Part-time units were organised to supplement the MRLA and to help with non-combat duties. In local operations they might be called upon to supplement MRLA forces.

The rest of the year went much the same way, the MRLA trying to overwhelm small police stations without much success and with considerable casualties. The program of destruction and terror continued. The security forces continued to track the MRLA by using the main paths, with no dispersal drills in the jungle. The MRLA was faced by a two faceted problem. It could go deeper into the jungle, becoming more divorced from the people, and setting up bases out of reach of the security forces; or stay where it was and be defeated every time it came out of the fringes of the jungle.

In the Autumn the MCP finally realized that the MRLA was trying to run before it could walk. Offensive efforts were reduced and the MRLA embarked on a program of training for both officers and men.

At this stage, the Security Forces had experienced considerable success. A few isolated police stations had been overrun but the majority had held out against the MRLA. The police radio network's efficiency had increased, enabling Security forces to move in and counter-attack quickly. Many who had been suspected of helping the MRLA had been arrested and the weapon of deportation more heavily wielded. Whole squatter encampments were rounded up and interned, and many Chinese were deported to China.

Another measure was an agreement with Thailand, setting up a joint Thailand-Malay military force and allowing Federation Police to cross the border in pursuit of guerillas. But the joint police force was ineffective due to the Thai  police's indifference, and guerilla supplies flowed across the border.

On 6 September the Government announced surrender terms for the MRLA and dropped a million leaflets from RAF aircraft. Only 116 MRLA surrendered, despite the government's correct impression of the state of morale. This was the end of the first phase. The guerilla army had not been ready when the insurrection began. It had many problems to deal with, including disillusionment among its ranks. No foreign aid was arriving, and the British response had been swift and effective. If the "Pause" had not occurred there would have been no MRLA. Had the army been ready when the insurrection began it might have been able to seize some Liberated Areas, but it would still have stood little chance against the well-trained, battle hardened troops of the British Army with its air support. It lacked heavy weapons and the manpower to defeat or dislodge the British in battle.

1.External Communist pressure was brought to bear through aid promised by Soviet observers who wanted to encourage insurrection in Asia, particularly in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Such insurrection would distract and divert the attention and energies of the three remaining powers in Europe: Britain, Holland and France.
 

2.Malaya's economy was fast recovering, and the MCP had failed to gain power or influence through its moderate policy of economic sabotage and labour unrest. Moreover, this approach had been championed by the discredited Lai Teck, and the new leader obviously had to try something different. Chin Peng also knew that drastic action was needed to bring all factions of the MCP together and save the party from splintering or being corroded by internal quarrels.
 

3.Mao Tse-tung was having great success in Manchuria. His Red Army was swelling and he was pushing back the Nationalist troops. In light of this Tse-tung's writings on guerilla and protracted warfare were eagerly accepted by MCP leaders. Moscow influence was fading, to be replaced by that of the Red Chinese.
 

4.Other Communist insurrections in Greece and French Indo-China were gaining ground. Britain had just left a
small and unpopular war in Palestine by UN mandate, and the MCP perceived that the British would not want to be involved in another war like it so soon.
 

5.The MCP anticipated help, backing and recognition from the Soviet Union. This might cause Britain to withdraw prematurely. Recognition from the Soviet Union might also lead the UN to take up the MCP cause, as they had done in Palestine.

Once the crucial decision was taken a program was mapped out, and steps were taken to form a guerilla army. The programwas:

1.April: increasingly widespread labour unrest
2.May: large scale political demonstrations
3.June: insurrection.
 

All of this would go on while terrorism and intimidation were being used to raise the level of chaos, fear and uncertainty that wouldform the springboard for the insurrection. The MCP also vaguely hoped the British Government might be pressuredinto a premature evacuation by this rise in activity, rather than become involved in what might become another Palestine problem. On the other hand, the activity would warn the government and police as to the intentions of the MCP.

These activities did indeed warn the government which was able to take precautionary measures in time. But that came Later. The aim was to create a Communist republic in Malaya. This would be accomplished in fourseparate stages, which were to follow each other in quick succession. The stages were:

1. Aggressive guerilla warfare in the interior, forcing Europeans from lonely estates, mines and industrial projects, and the police and government from small towns and villages.
 

2. Temporary guerilla bases to be set up in the areas evacuated, which were to be deemed Liberated Areas. This was to be a period of military expansion.
 

3. Territorial expansion, with a widening of control of the interior areas.
 

4. A guerilla army taking to the field against British troops in any towns where they might be concentrated and perhaps also against Singapore.
 

The MCP believed the pattern established in Palestine would be repeated.